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Title VI of the Espionage Act 1 makes liable to seizure, de-
tention, and forfeiture "arms or munitions of war or other ar-
ticles" about to be unlawfully exported or shipped from or taken
out of the United States, or,
. . . whenever there shall be known or probable cause
to believe that any such arms or munitions of war, or other
articles, are being or are intended to be exported, or shipped
from, or taken out of the United States in violation of
law. "
The closing paragraph of Title VI declares:
"Except in those cases in which the exportation of
arms and munitions of war or other articles is forbidden
by proclamation or otherwise by the President, as provided
in section one of this title, nothing herein contained shall be
construed to extend to, or interfere with any trade in such
commodities, conducted with any foreign port or place what-
soever, or with any other trade which might have been law-
fully carried on before the passage of this title, under the
law of nations, or under the treaties or conventions entered
into by the United States, or under the laws thereof." 2
The first section of Title VI provides that in the event of an
attempt to ship, export, or take out of the United States arms
or munitions or other articles "in violation of law," or in the
event that there is reasonable or probable cause to believe that
such shipment, exportation, or removal from the United States is
being made or is contemplated "in violation of law," that
S..the several collectors, naval officers, surveyors, in-
spectors of customs, and marshals, and deputy marshals of
140 STAT. 223, § I (I917), 22 U. S. C. A. §238 (1926).
240 STAT. 225, §6 (097), 22 U. S. C.A. §243 (1926).
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the United States, and every other person duly authorized for
that purpose by the President may seize and detain. . , 3
The availability of the recourse given by Title VI in time of
peace, when there is no recognized state of foreign belligerency,
no conditions internal or external to this country which might
be deemed to constitute a national emergency, to restrain and
punish the exportation of arms and other munitions of war,
anino belligerandi, in violation of the law of nations and treaties
of the United States stipulating upon its peaceful sanctions, is a
subject which commands thoughtful consideration. The silence
of Title VI, as to when it is operative by reason of Presidential
proclamation as alluded to in Section 6 thereof, has created some
doubt whether the remedy it gives is ever available when the
United States is neither a neutral nor a belligerent, except as con-
sequent upon some proclamation of the President or executive
decree in pursuance thereof, forbidding a traffic in arms other-
wise lawful, or except as the intended shipment may be in aid
of, or in furtherance of a hostile expedition, prepared or fitted
out in American territory, against a people with which the United
States are in amity. This latter construction of Title VI, very
narrowly limiting its practical utility as a measure designed to
maintain the peaceful intercourse of the United States with
foreign countries, would appear to rest upon a misconception, not
only of the general purpose of the Espionage Act of June i5th,
1917,4 but as to the situation which existed prior to its enact-
ment. The early neutrality laws, while expressly imposing no
restraint upon a commerce wholly free and justifiable by the law
of nations, were so restricted in their application that many trans-
actions, violative of the law of nations and treaties of the United
States, escaped their operation, and very especially in time of
peace unaccompanied by a state of recognized belligerency in
foreign countries with which the United States was in amity.
The case was one of frequently violated public rights as to which
there was no available remedy; and from this the conclusion has
'Supra note i.
'40 STAT. 217 (1917).
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been not infrequently drawn, that what was without remedy was
per se lawful. Thus a trade lawful prior to the enactment of
Title VI of the Espionage Act is to be sharply contradistinguished
from one violative of the obligations of the United States under
the law of nations, treaties and conventions thereof, though not
comprehended within the offenses contemplated by the early neu-
trality statutes, or, prior to the Act of June 15, 1917, referred to
by statute as an offense against the United States. In this light,
it is submitted that Title VI has a very broad application, and one
in large measure independent of a political discretion whose
clear object in all cases where conferred has been to permit the
embargo of a commerce otherwise lawful by the law of nations.
The wording of Title VI leaves no room for doubt that
it is the unlawfulness of the intended, attempted, or probably con-
templated or designed shipment, exportation, or removal from
the United States, which is th condition precedent to the recourse
in ren given, as against the articles described. Certain enumer-
ated officers of the United States are expressly given a discre-
tionary authority to make a provisional seizure and sequestration
of these articles, and to pursue thereafter the procedure indicated.
Other persons, it is true, may be authorized by the President to
do these things; but if the unlawful character of the acts or con-
templated acts set forth in this title is in any degree dependent
upon executive proclamation, evidence thereto must be sought
elsewhere than in the express language used therein. Title VI is,
as has been stated, cryptic in its own allusion as to what may, by
executive proclamation, be made illegal, in respect to that which
by the law of nations, treaties, and laws of the United States is
per se lawful, and as to which Title VI may not apply ex proprio
vigore.
It is an important fact that Title VI of the Espionage Act
was considered by its framers, not as a war measure, but em-
phatically one "to preserve peace"; again, that Title VI was de-
bated as a matter of legislation wholly separate and distinct from
other titles of the Act of June 15, 1917, having regard to the main-
tenance of neutrality and the powers of the Executive during a
war in which the United States is a party, or during a time of
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national emergency.5 As such, Title VI was enacted under the
power of Congress "to define and punish . . . Offenses
against the Law of Nations." 6 Its validity, as a measure to re-
strain and punish such offenses, is not lessened by its omission to
specify what is illegal at all times by that general law or treaties
stipulating upon it.7
Title VI has been construed by the Department of Justice to
provide for the seizure of arms and other munitions of war whose
export is illegal by force of the statutes or proclamations of the
competent authorities.8  The words "arms and munitions of war
or other articles" have been judicially declared to relate to that
which is at all times unlawful, or is made so by proclamation of
the President.'
It is further important that Title VI stands unrelated by any
express provision therein contained to any criminal proceeding
against persons guilty of the unlawful acts or attempted acts for
which it provides a remedy; and therefore is independent, for its
efficacy, of other recourse under the Criminal Code of the United
States. In the case of The Three Friends,1° the Supreme Court
held that the forfeiture as provided by Section ii of the Act of
i9O9," did not depend upon the conviction of a person or persons
for doing the act denounced by that section. The Court said:
"The suit is a civil suit in rem for the condemnation of
the vessel only, and is not a criminal prosecution.
Indeed forfeiture might be decreed if the proof showed the
prohibited acts were committed though lacking as to the
identity of the particular person by whom they were com-
mitted. . . . The thing is here primarily considered as
the offender, or rather the offense is attached primarily to
the thing, and this whether the offense be malum prohibitum
or inalum in se. The same principle applies to proceedings in
'54 CONG. REC. 3417 (1917).
U. S. CONSTITUTION, Art. I, Sec. 8.
7 U. S. v. Ariona, 120 U. S. 479, 7 Sup. Ct. 628 (I886).
832 Op. ATT'Y GEN. 132, 134 (920).
9 U. S. v. Two Hundred, etc., Gold Pieces, 255 Fed. 217 (W. D. Wash.
I919).
I66 U. S. I, 17 Sup. Ct. 495 (897).
"35 STAT. 1090, § II (igog), I8 U. S. C. A. §23 (1926).
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rem on seizure in the Admiralty. Many cases exist where
the forfeiture for the act done attaches solely in rein, and
there is no accompanying penalty in personam. Many cases
exist where there is both a forfeiture in rem and a personal
penalty. But in neither class of cases has it ever been de-
cided that the prosecutions were dependent on each other.
But the practice has been, and so this court understands the
law to be, that the proceeding in rem stands independent of
and wholly unaffected by any criminal procedure in per-
solaill."' 12
The application of this principle, mutatis mutandis, in con-
struction of Title VI, conclusively demonstrates that this title
is wholly independent of the identity of the owner or the" shippers
of the arms or munitions of war, or other articles prohibited, as in-
deed it is of any question of their responsibility under other crim-
inal statutes of the United States. It is the shipment, be it malum
prohibitum, or inalum in se, which is condemned and made liable
to proceedings in rein on the instance side of the admiralty court,
as distinguished from a forfeiture in prize for violation of the
laws of war or of neutrality.
Recurring to other titles of the Act of June 15, 1917,13 it
will be observed that, by Title II thereof, the President is given
power, whenever by proclamation or executive order he declares
a national emergency to exist by reason of actual or threatened
war, insurrection, invasion, or disturbance of the international
relations of the United States, to subject all vessels, be they do-
mestic or foreign, within the territorial waters of the United
States, etc., to restraints of enumerated character. Section 3,
however, of that title 14 provides that it shall be unlawful for the
owner, master, any member of the crew, or any other person,
knowingly to permit any vessel, as above described, to be used
as a place of resort for any person conspiring with another, or
preparing to commit any offense against the United States, or in
violation of the treaties of the United States, or of the obligations
"Supra note io, at 49, 17 Sup. Ct. at 497; see U. S. v. La Vengeance, 3
Dall. 297, 301 (U. S. 1796) ; I STAT. 369 (794).
40STAT. 220 (917).
2440 STAT. 220, § 3 (1917), 5o U. S. C. A. § 193 (1926).
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of the United States under the law of nations. The first character-
ization of the offenses as to which the use of the vessel is forbidden
to those conspiring or preparing to commit them, clearly compre-
hends those which are such by the so-called neutrality laws as re-
enacted, or those which are made criminal by the Act of June
i 5th, 1917, in a time of war in which the United States is en-
gaged, or which are offenses against the United States within the
meaning of other provisions of that act or the Criminal Code of
the United States. The latter two designations of Section 3,
Title VI '" have clearly to do with the relations of the United
States with nations in amity, whether as defined by treaty or sub-
sisting independently of treaty by the law of nations. It is seen
that the provisional power conferred upon the President in Sec-
tion i of Title 11,10 is thus aided by penalties, effective, whether in
time of peace, of national emergency, of war in which the United
States may be a neutral, or of war in which the United
States may be a party, and which penalties are clearly de-
signed to prevent and punish that which by its very occurrence
might create a national emergency, or give rise to any of the
offences enumerated, whether malum in se or malum prohibi-
turn. Section 3 of Title II 17 is then independent of Presidential
proclamation and the general restraints which may, consequent
upon it, be imposed by executive order or decree upon all vessels
within the territorial waters, etc., of the United States; and may
well comprehend that which, by Title VI, is not lawful, as therein
contemplated, in respect of attempted shipment of arms, etc.,
whether the illegality thereof flows from the law of nations,
treaties and conventions of the United States, the laws thereof,
or executive proclamation. If the shipment constitutes an offense
against the United States, or an infraction of its obligations
under the law of nations or the treaties thereof, Title II, Sec-
tion 3 applies, and it is enough that the conspiracy or preparation
to commit such an offense was knowingly permitted to occur on
board. Since such shipments are equally offenses whether designed
1540 STAT. 224, §3 (917), 22 U. S. C. A. §240 (1926).
1640 STAT. 220, § 1 (1917), 50 U. S. C. A. § 191 (1926).
17Supra note 14.
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on board ship, or attempted to be committed on land within the
jurisdiction of the United States, it is patent that, neither in one
case nor in the other, is the occurrence of those things which Title
II, Section 3, and Title VI, Section i of the Act of June 15, 1917
designed to preclude and punish in the attempt, dependent ex-
clusively on that which may be made unlawful by Presidential
order consequent upon some national emergency of so grave a
character as to warrant sweeping and general measures of all-
inclusive character. Both sections clearly contemplate the pre-
vention of acts which would be substantive offenses against the
United States, its peaceful intercourse with other nations, as
well as its rights as a neutral or again as a belligerent, quite
independently of any extraordinary executive authority designed
to strengthen the national defense, safeguard the public peace,
or maintain its peaceful policies.
The Act of March 14, 1912,18 was repealed by the Act of
January 3, 1922,1' which provides that whenever the President
finds that in any American country, or in any country in which the
United States exercises extraterritorial jurisdiction "conditions of
domestic violence exist, which are (or may be) promoted by the
use of arms or munitions of war procured from the United
States," the President may by proclamation declare unlawful
the exportation of any arms or munitions of war to such places.
This discretionary power vested by Congress in the President to
forbid by proclamation all export commerce in munitions of war
in the case specified, is effective independently of whether the
existing conditions of domestic violence have or have not reached
a state of recognized belligerency. If these conditions amount to
the latter, the act contemplates a conditional restriction on contra-
band trade, not arising from any obligation of neutrality to be
deduced from international law.20 It contemplates the making
unlawful of that which per se is lawful; and short of a state of
recognized belligerency, it furnishes the Executive with a power to
lay a special embargo on all trade in arms with the country or
237 STAT. 630 (1912).
42 STAT. 361 (1922), 22 U. S. C. A. §236 (1926).
FENWICK, NEUTRALITy LAWS OF THE UNITED STATES (1913) I58, I59.
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countries to which his proclamation may relate, whether or not
such trade be knowingly conducted, animo belligerandi. Title VI
of the Espionage Act, in the light of the aforesaid enactments, is
seen to give a recourse in favor of what is thus made illegal con-
sequent upon the President's proclamation; but is not thereby
limited.
Wholly apart from these considerations and the interpreta-
tions of these statutes, or other sections and titles of the Espionage
Act and Title VI, the latter bears a marked resemblance to the
Act of March IO, 1838,21 which act expired by limitation two
years later. This statute authorized and required enumerated
officers of the United States and "every other officer who may be
specially empowered for the purpose by the President," to seize
and detain any vessel, vehicle, or munitions of war, provided or
prepared for any military expedition or enterprise against the
territory or dominion of any foreign prince or state, or of any
colony, district, or people co-terminous with the United States,
contrary to the 6th Section of the Act of April 20, i818 ;22 or
wherever the character of the vessel or vehicle, and the quantity
of arms and munitions or other circumstances furnished prob-
able cause to believe that said vessel or vehicle, arms and muni-
tions of war were intended to be employed by the owner or owners
thereof, or any other person or persons, with his or their privity,
in carrying on any expedition or operations within the terri-
tories or dominions of any foreign prince, or state, etc., co-termin-
ous with the United States, with the proviso that nothing in the
act was to be construed
. . . to extend to or interfere with any trade in arms
or munitions of war conducted in vessels by sea, with any
foreign port or place whatsoever, or with any other trade,
which might have been lawfully carried on before the pass-
age of this act under the law of nations, and the provisions
of the act hereby amended."
This early statute plainly did not purport to change the exist-
ing neutrality laws of the United States or to restrict any com-
' 5 STAT. 212 (1838).
'3 STAT. 449 (I818), 18 U. S. C. A. §25 (1926).
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merce, lawful per se; but while aiding the enforcement of Section
6 of the Act of April 20, 1818, in making liable to seizure and con-
demnation munitions of war provided or prepared for any military
expedition or enterprise originating in the United States and
punishable under said section of the Act of 1818, the statute went
further and included the case of an intended shipment of arms,
made animo belligerandi for the purpose of carrying on a hostile
expedition or operation within the territory of a foreign state,
etc., co-terminous with the United States, a traffic plainly deemed
by the statute inimical to the peaceful intercourse of the United
States with such foreign state and in contravention of the obli-
gations of the United States under the law of nations.
These obligations have been defined in comprehensive terms
by the Supreme Court of the United States and its decision there-
on has the force of supreme law. In the case of Kennett v. Cham-
bers,23 Chief Justice Taney, delivering the unanimous opinion of
the Court, declared:
"The intercourse of this country with foreign nations,
and its policy in regard to them, are placed by the Consti-
tution of the United States in the hands of the govern-
ment, and its decisions upon these subjects are obliga-
tory upon every citizen of the Union. He is bound to
be at war with the nation against which the war making
power has declared war, and equally bound to com-
mit no act of hostility against a nation with which the gov-
ernment is in amity and friendship. This principle is uni-
versally acknowledged by the law of nations. It lies at the
foundation of all government, as there could be no social
order or peaceful relations between the citizens of differ-
ent countries without it. It is, however, more emphatically
true in relation to citizens of the United States. For as the
sovereignty resides in the people, every citizen is a portion
of it, and is himself personally bound by the laws which
the representatives of the sovereignty may pass, or the trea-
ties into which they may enter, within the scope of their
delegated authority. And when that authority has plighted
its faith to another nation that there shall be peace and friend-
C3 14 How. 38, 49 (U. S. 1852). Italics are the author's.
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ship between the citizens of the two countries, every citizen
of the United States is equally and personally pledged. The
compact is made by the department of the government upon
which he himself has agreed to confer the power. It is his
own personal compact as a portion of the sovereignty in
whose behalf it is made. And he can do no act, nor enter into
any agreement to promote or encourage revolt or hostilities
against the territories of a country with which our govern-
ment is pledged by treaty to be at peace, without a breach of
duty as a citizen and the breach of faith pledged to the for-
eign nation."
It is further significant that the early American treaties of
amity, commerce and navigation, stipulated for perpetual peace,
and the majority of them in order "to make as durable as possible
the relations which are established" provide that:
"If one or more of the citizens of either party shall in-
fringe any of the articles of this treaty, such citizen shall be
held personally responsible for the same, and harmony and
good correspondence between the two nations shall not be
interrupted thereby, each party engaging in no way to pro-
tect the offender or sanction such violation." 24
It may be doubted whether this obligation can be said to have
expired with the expiration of these treaties, or have been more
than suspended in case of war.25 The treaty has stipulated in per-
petuity on the superintending sanctions of the law of nations. 26
A trade in arms such as that inhibited by Section 2 of the
Act of March IO, 1838, 27 is not dependent in respect of its il-
legality upon any proclamation of the President. Indeed the
duty of the executive branch of the government to restrain it
would seem to be independent of any statutory enactment. The
Supreme Court of the United States has declared:
" See, for example, I MA.LOY, TREATIES, CONVENTIONS, ETC., BETWEEN THE
UNITED STATES AND OTHER PowERs, 1776-i99 (igio) 124, treaty with Bolivia,
concluded May 13, 1858, art. XXXVI.
'.5 MOORE, INTERNATIONAL LAW DIGEST (19o6) § 779.
" I PHILI MORE, COMMENTARIES UPON INTERNATIONAL LAW (3d ed. 1879)
§219.
" Supra note 21.
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"The law of nations requires every national govern-
ment to use due diligence to prevent a wrong being done
within its own dominions to another nation with which it is
at peace, or to the people thereof." 28
Such a trade is then to be deemed unlawful within the mean-
ing of Title VI of the Act of June 15, 1917,29 as an act done to
promote or encourage revolt or hostilities against the territories
of a nation in amity with the United States, and this whether
or not connected with an expedition or enterprise of military or
naval character commenced in the United States against such
foreign state, and though the hostile enterprise, operation, or
expedition to which the shipment contributes originates on the
high seas or in foreign parts.
The similarity in the general wording of the Act of 1836 and
that of Title VI, and very especially the omission in the latter of
any allusion to Section 6 of the Act of i818 30 as amended and em-
bodied in Title V of the Espionage Act,3 or indeed as to ship-
ments of munitions of war of the character described in Section
2 of the Act of 1838, is deemed significant.
Title V, Section 8, of the Espionage Act 32 amends and
broadens, by including naval expeditions, Section 13 of the Act
of March 4, I9o9, 33 which corresponded to Section 6 of the Act
of April 20, i818. A4 It however limited the offenses disjunctively
enumerated to those knowingly committed. This title is ex-
pressly declared to relate to the enforcement of neutrality, and
the first four sections deal with executive powers and neutral
obligations "during a war in which the United States is a neutral
nation." Whether or not, in its amended form, it was intended
to be operative only when this country is a neutral, has been
deemed open to question. This being true, however, Title V,
Section 8, would fail to give a recourse against a shipment of
U. S. v. Arjona, sitpra note 7, at 484, 7 Sup. Ct. at 630.
Supra note i.
' Supra note 22.
'140 STAT. 221 (1917).
240 STAT. 223, §8 (1917), I8 U. S. C. A. §8 (1926).
35 STAT. 1090, § 13 (igog), 18 U. S. C. A. §25 (I926).
Supra note 22.
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arms in aid of a hostile expedition when no recognized state
of belligerency obtained in the foreign state in amity, against
which such expedition was organized within the United States.
The Act of April 2o, 1818, embracing the so-called neutrality
laws of the United States, as embodied in the Criminal Code of
i9og, Sections 9 to 13,3 made no mention of the word neutrality,
and has been repeatedly enforced for the purpose of preventing
hostile expeditions from the United States against friendly na-
tions attempting to suppress insurgents not recognized by the
United States as belligerents." This is consistent with the con-
tention that:
"If . . . the persons supplying or carrying arms
and munitions from a place in the United States are in any
wise parties to a design that force shall be employed against
'(a foreign nation in amity with this country, and which is
endeavoring to put down an unrecognized insurrection)'
. . . the enterprise is not commercial, but military, and
is in violation of international law and of our own stat-
utes." 37
If there be existing a state of recognized belligerency, Title
VI, while the United States is a neutral, and in the absence of a
proclamation forbidding the exportation of arms, would ad-
mittedly not give a recourse against a contraband trade, lawful
by the law of nations, or one not inconsistent with the neutrality
of the United States. Shipments of contraband are, however,
remitted to the laws of prize, and are liable to seizure and con-
demnation by the offended belligerent. In time of peace, however,
if there be existing no state of recognized belligerency in a foreign
state in amity with the United States, or indeed of any civil
strife in such foreign country, unless Title VI be deemed to give
a recourse, the occasion of an attempted shipment of munitions
of war, made with hostile intent against such foreign sovereign,
and unconnected with a military expedition or enterprise originat-
ing or organized and set on foot within the United States, would
335 STAT. 1O89, §§ 9-I3 (igog).
'Hyde, The Espionage Act (i918) 12 Am. J. INT. LAW 143.
3731 Op. AT-r'y GE-;. 271 (x118).
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seem to escape the punitive and preventive processes of the laws.
This would be to say that acts done knowingly within the United
States, with deliberate intent to subvert the peace of a foreign
state in amity with it, do not constitute violations of the obliga-
tions of the United States, and offenses no less against its sov-
ereignty than that of the foreign sovereign, and are not prevent-
able and punishable, although a conspiracy alone to disturb the
peaceful intercourse of the United States with foreign nations is
a crime under its statutes, and as such an offense against the
United States."8
The Supreme Court of the United States, in construing the
conspiracy clauses of the Espionage Act and the criminal laws,
has held that the question in every case was as to whether the
acts, or words, or conspiracies were such as to create a clear and
present danger, likely to bring about the substantive evils that
Congress had a right to prevent. 39 The act, then, in its totality,
must be construed to forbid, or to provide the means to restrain
and punish, whatever, through a combination of actors, would be
at once productive of serious international complications, or
violative of the policy of the United States, no less than of its
obligations under the laws of nations and treaties. In like sense,
and by its very consistency with the law of nations, Title VI
must be deemed broadly applicable to all trade in munitions of
war not lawful by the law of nations or treaties of the United
States, and as such deemed to provide measures preventive of
a traffic in arms which would threaten the peaceful intercourse,
the neutrality, or the security of the United States, be the traffic
malum in se, or nmalum prohibitum.
"*See 35 STAT. Io96, §37 (igog), 18 U. S. C. A. §88 (1926) ; see Ford v.
U. S., 273 U. S. 593, 618-624, 47 Sup. Ct. 531, 539-541 (1927).
Hyde and Schneider v. U. S., 225 U. S. 347, 32 Sup. Ct. 793 (1912);
Brown v. Elliot, 225 U. S. 392, 32 Sup. Ct 812 (1912); Schenck v. U. S., 249
U. S. 47, 39 Sup. Ct. 247 (1919); Pierce v. U. S., 252 U. S. 239, 40 Sup. Ct.
205 (192o); Milwaukee Pub. Co. v. Burleson, 255 U. S. 407, 41 Sup. Ct. 352
(1921).
